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Abstract
We answer an open question about Quantum Key Recycling (QKR): Is it possible to put
the message entirely in the qubits without increasing the number of qubits? We show that
this is indeed possible. We introduce a prepare-and-measure QKR protocol where the com-
munication from Alice to Bob consists entirely of qubits. As usual, Bob responds with an
authenticated one-bit accept/reject classical message.1
Compared to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), QKR has reduced round complexity. Com-
pared to previous qubit-wise QKR protocols, our scheme has far less classical communication.
We provide a security proof in the universal composability framework and find that the
communication rate is asymptotically the same as for QKD with one-way postprocessing.
1 Introduction
1.1 Quantum Key Recycling
QKR achieves information-theoretically secure communication in such a way that no key material
is used up as long as the quantum channel is undisturbed. Compared to QKD followed by classical
one-time-pad message encryption, QKR’s main advantage is reduced round complexity: QKR needs
only one message from Alice to Bob, and one authenticated bit from Bob to Alice. QKD needs
at least two messages from Alice to Bob. Furthermore, a minor advantage is that QKR does not
discard any qubits, whereas QKD does.
A prepare-and-measure QKR scheme based on qubits was proposed already in 1982 [1]. Then
QKR received little attention for a long time. A security proof2 for qubit-based3 QKR was given
only in 2017 by Fehr and Salvail [4]. In [5] it was shown (for a scheme similar to [4]) that the
communication rate in case of a noisy quantum channel is asymptotically the same as for QKD
with one-way postprocessing.
1.2 Related work; putting the message in the quantum states
Different from the classical setting, in the quantum cryptographic setting authentication implies
encryption [6]. Portmann [7] showed that quantum authentication is possible with re-use of all
the encryption keys, but states as an open problem to find a prepare-and-measure QKR scheme
for classical messages.
All currently existing qubit-wise prepare-and-measure QKR schemes encode random bits rather
than the message into the quantum state, and then extract a classical One-Time Pad (OTP) from
these random bits. Alice sends a classical ciphertext (the message xor’ed with the OTP) along
with the quantum states.
In 2003 Gottesman [8] proposed a scheme called ‘Unclonable Encryption’ which encodes a message
directly into qubit states. Although some of the keys in his schemes can be re-used, still n key bits
are discarded when sending an n-bit message. The high-dimensional QKR of Damg˚ard, Pedersen
1 The title refers to the movie character Silent Bob, who hardly ever speaks.
2 For a scheme slightly different from [1].
3 as opposed to schemes that work with higher-dimensional spaces, e.g. using mutually unbiased bases [2, 3].
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and Salvail [2, 3] has full recycling of keys, but requires quantum computation for encryption and
decryption.
1.3 Contributions
We answer the open question whether it is possible to have prepare-and-measure qubit-based
QKR with the message entirely contained in the qubits, without increasing the number of qubits.
The answer is affirmative. We present such a scheme; compared to [5] Alice’s classical message is
removed.
While the contribution of this paper may not have a great practical impact (after all the classical
channel is a cheap resource compared to the quantum channel), we find that reducing the overall
communication to the bare minimum is of theoretical interest.
• Our protocol is a modification of the scheme by Leermakers and Sˇkoric´ [5]. The main difference
lies in the masking of the message and in the privacy amplification.
• In case of Reject, Alice and Bob have to tap into fresh key material. We implement this
key update by hashing fresh key material into the old keys. This reduces the Reject-case key
expenditure with respect to [4] and [5]. In the absence of noise the Reject-case key expenditure
asymptotically equals the length of the message, which is optimal [2].
• We prove the security of our protocol against general attacks. We use a universally composable
measure of security, namely the diamond norm between the actual protocol and an idealized
protocol in which the secrets are replaced by random strings after protocol execution. The proof
follows the same steps as [5], and at an early stage the Accept-case part of the proof reduces
exactly to the derivation in [5]. Notably, this proof technique achieves optimal rates for 6-state
as well as 4-state encodings.
• The asymptotic communication rate of our scheme (the number of message bits divided by the
number of qubits) equals that of QKD with one-way postprocessing. The finite-size effects are
the same as [5], but with an additional small term due to the new key refresh procedure in the
Reject case.
1.4 Outline
In Section 2 we introduce notation and briefly review post-selection and the results of [5]. We state
our motivation in Section 3, and we list the steps of the proposed protocol in Section 4. Section 5
presents a stepwise re-formulation of the protocol which is equivalent in terms of security but
better suited to the proof technique. In Section 6 we derive the output state of the protocol, and
in Section 7 we give the security proof. We conclude with a discussion and suggestions for future
work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and terminology
Classical Random Variables (RVs) are denoted with capital letters, and their realisations with
lowercase letters. The probability that a RV X takes value x is written as Pr[X = x]. The
expectation with respect to RV X is denoted as Exf(x) =
∑
x∈X Pr[X = x]f(x). Sets are denoted
in calligraphic font. The notation ‘log’ stands for the logarithm with base 2. The notation h stands
for the binary entropy function h(p) = p log 1p+(1−p) log 11−p . Sometimes we write h({p1, . . . , pk})
meaning
∑
i pi log
1
pi
. Bitwise XOR of binary strings is written as ‘⊕’. The Kronecker delta is
denoted as δab. The complement of a bit b ∈ {0, 1} is written as b¯ = 1− b. The Hamming weight
of a binary string x is written as |x|. We will speak about ‘the bit error rate γ of a quantum
channel’. This is defined as the probability that a classical bit g, sent by Alice embedded in a
qubit, arrives at Bob’s side as g¯. We write 1 for the identity matrix.
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For quantum states we use Dirac notation. A qubit state with classical bit x encoded in basis
b is written as |ψbx〉. We call x the payload. We will always assume that we are working with
6-state encoding (known from 6-state QKD, with three possible bases) or 8-state encoding [9, 10].
Occasionally we will comment if a result is different for BB84-encoding.
The notation ‘tr’ stands for trace. Let A have eigenvalues λi. The 1-norm of A is written
as ‖A‖1 = tr
√
A†A =
∑
i |λi|. The trace distance between matrices ρ and σ is denoted as
δ(ρ;σ) = 12 ||ρ− σ||1. It is a generalisation of the statistical distance and represents the maximum
possible advantage one can have in distinguishing ρ from σ.
Quantum states with non-italic label ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘E’ indicate the subsystem of Alice/Bob/Eve.
Consider uniform classical variables X,Y and a quantum system under Eve’s control that depends
on X and Y . The combined classical-quantum state is ρXY E = Exy|xy〉〈xy| ⊗ ρExy. The state of a
sub-system is obtained by tracing out all the other subspaces, e.g. ρY E = trXρ
XY E = Ey|y〉〈y|⊗ρEy ,
with ρEy = Exρ
E
xy. The fully mixed state on Hilbert space HA is denoted as χA. The security of the
variable X, given that Eve holds the ‘E’ subsystem, can be expressed in terms of a trace distance
as follows [11],
d(X|E) def= δ
(
ρXE ; χX ⊗ ρE
)
(1)
i.e. the distance between the true classical-quantum state and a state in which X is completely
unknown to Eve.
We write S(HA) to denote the space of density matrices on the Hilbert space HA. Any quantum
channel can be described by a completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map E : S(HA) →
S(HB) that transforms a mixed state ρA to ρB: E(ρA) = ρB. For a map E : S(HA)→ S(HB), the
notation E(ρAC) stands for (E ⊗ 1C)(ρAC), i.e. E acts only on the A subsystem.
The diamond norm of E is defined as ‖E‖ = 12 supρAC∈S(HAC) ‖E(ρAC)‖1 with HC an auxiliary
system that can be considered to be of the same dimension as HA. The diamond norm ‖E − E ′‖
can be used to upper bound the probability of distinguishing two CPTP maps E and E ′ given that
the process is observed once. The maximum probability of a correct guess is 12 +
1
4‖E − E ′‖. The
security of a protocol is often quantified by the diamond norm between the real protocol E and
an protocol with ideal functionality F . When ‖E − F‖ ≤ ε we can consider E to behave ideally
except with probability ε; this security metric is composable with other (sub-)protocols [12].
A family of hash functions H = {h : X → T } is called pairwise independent (a.k.a. 2–independent
or strongly universal) [13] if for all distinct pairs x, x′ ∈ X and all pairs y, y′ ∈ T it holds that
Prh∈H [h(x) = y ∧ h(x′) = y′] = |T |−2. Here the probability is over random h ∈ H. Pairwise
independence can be achieved with a hash family of size |H| = |X |.
2.2 Definition of QKR rate and security
We define the rate of a quantum communication protocol as the number of useful message bits
communicated per sent qubit.
Informally, we define QKR security as follows. Let k denote all the shared keys of Alice and Bob
in the current instantiation of the protocol. Let k˜ be the keys in the next instantiation, computed
in a way that depends on Bob’s feedback. We define the Key Recycling property as follows,
• If Bob’s feedback message is Accept, then k˜ is computed without tapping into new key material.4
Two security properties must be satisfied:
• Even if Eve intercepts the whole ciphertext, she cannot obtain any information about the
message.
• Using k˜ in the next instantiation does not endanger any message.
Formally, we work with an EPR-state based version of the protocol. We consider a quantum-
classical state ρKK˜MΩE containing the classical random variables K, K˜,M,Ω, where M is the
message and Ω is Bob’s feedback bit, as well as Eve’s quantum side information (the subsystem
4 Note that we do not require re-use of the exact same keys in unmodified form.
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denoted as ‘E’). This state is the result of the protocol E acting on an input state σ which
represents the noisy EPR pairs prepared by Eve, ρKK˜MΩE = E(σ). An ‘ideal’ version of the
protocol is denoted as F , and we write ϕKK˜MΩE = F(σ). It satisfies ϕMΩE = ϕM ⊗ ϕΩE and
ϕK˜MΩE = ϕK˜ ⊗ ϕMΩE. The first equation expresses the fact that the message M is entirely
decoupled from the subsystems available to Eve. The second says that, even in the case of known
plaintext, Eve has no information about the updated key K˜. We say that the QKR scheme E is
ε-secure if ‖E − F‖ ≤ ε.
2.3 Post-selection
For protocols that are invariant under permutation of their inputs it has been shown [14] that
security against collective attacks (the same attack applied to each qubit individually) implies
security against general attacks, at the cost of extra privacy amplification. Let E be a protocol
that acts on S(H⊗nAB) and let F describe the perfect functionality of that protocol. If for all
permutations pi on the input there exists a map Kpi on the output such that E ◦ pi = Kpi ◦ E then,
‖E − F‖ ≤ (n+ 1)d2−1 max
σ∈S(HABE)
∥∥∥(E − F)(σ⊗n)∥∥∥
1
(2)
where d is the dimension of the HAB space. (d = 4 for qubits). The product form σ⊗n greatly
simplifies the security analysis: now it suffices to prove security against ‘collective’ attacks, and
to pay a price 2(d2 − 1) log(n + 1) in the amount of privacy amplification, i.e. the output size of
the privacy amplification step is reduced by this amount.
2.4 Brief summary of results from [5]
It was shown that the asymptotic communication rate of QKR is the same as the rate of QKD
with one-way postprocessing. Alice encodes random bits into the qubits; over a classical channel
she sends a ciphertext, OTP-encrypted information for error-correction, and an authentication
tag. Let the CPTP map E be the protocol of [5], and F its idealized version where the message
and the next round’s keys are completely unknown to Eve. It was shown that
‖E − F‖ ≤ 2−λ+1 + (n+ 1)15 min
(
ε+
1
2
trE
√
|B|n2`trBS
(
ρ¯BSE
)2
, Pcorr
)
, (3)
where λ is the length of the authentication tags, ε the amount of state ‘smoothing’ [11], n the
number of qubits, B the alphabet of the qubit basis choice, ` the message length, B the basis
sequence, S the random data encoded in the qubits, and Pcorr the noise-dependent probability
of successful error correction. The ρ¯BSE is the state E(σ⊗n) (see Section 2.3) smoothened by an
amount ε, with everything traced out except the B, S and E subsystems. If 6-state encoding5 of
bits is used then the 4× 4 matrix σ is completely determined [15] by a single parameter: the bit
error probability γ on the quantum channel. Asymptotically for large n, the bound (3) reduces to
‖E − F‖ ≤ 2−λ+1 + n15 min
(√
2`−n+nh({1−
3
2γ,
γ
2 ,
γ
2 ,
γ
2 })−nh(γ), Pcorr
)
, (4)
which yields exactly the same rate6 1−h({1− 32γ, γ2 , γ2 , γ2 }) as 6-state QKD with one-way postpro-
cessing.7 The security of N QKR rounds follows from ‖EN ◦· · ·◦E1−FN ◦· · ·◦F1‖ ≤ N‖E −F‖.
3 Motivation
As mentioned in Section 1, current QKR schemes all have some drawback. Either they require
a quantum computer for their implementation or they have classical ciphertext. In this work we
aim for a QKR protocol that has all the desiderata one would expect:
5 For 4-state (BB84) ‘conjugate’ coding Eve has two degrees of freedom, i.e. a more powerful attack.
6 The term nh(γ) gets cancelled because Alice and Bob expend nh(γ) bits of key material to OTP the redundancy
bits.
7 For 4-state encoding the result is different from (4) and yields the BB84 rate.
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• All actions on quantum states should be simple single-qubit actions like state preparation and
measurement.
• Alice should send only qubits, so that no bandwidth is wasted.
• Bob should send only an authenticated Accept/Reject bit.
• No key material should be consumed in case of Accept, and the bare minimum8 should be
consumed in case of Reject.
• The communication rate should equal that of QKD.
4 Our Quantum Key Recycling protocol
4.1 Protocol design considerations
Our protocol is very similar to [5]. There are two main differences:
1. There is no classical communication from Alice to Bob.
2. In case of Reject the keys are not thrown away. Instead, fresh key material is hashed into the
old keys to obtain the keys for the next round.
In the transformation from [5] to a protocol without classical ciphertext, there are several proof-
technical issues. Most importantly, the qubit payload X ∈ {0, 1}n needs to be uniformly random.
(See Section 5.3. In the proof the X acts as a uniform mask.) This has to be reconciled with
the fact that (i) the message is typically not uniform; (ii) the error-correction encoding step
introduces redundancy. Our solution to these issues is shown in Fig. 1, which depicts most of the
variables in the protocol. Alice first appends a random string r ∈ {0, 1}κ to the message, which
will serve for privacy amplification. Then she does the error correction encoding, resulting in a
codeword c ∈ {0, 1}n. The c is then masked with a one-time pad z; this masks any structure present
in c. A similar construction was proposed by Gottesman [8]. However, instead of discarding z we
re-use most of the entropy in z.
2 {0, 1}`
Alice Bob
µ k0 ⌧
c
x 2 {0, 1}n
m r
Enc Dec
2 {0, 1}n
2 {0, 1}`+
 z  z
Add random bits Discard random bits
Figure 1: Classical processing performed by Alice, and in reverse by Bob.
4.2 Setup and protocol steps
Alice and Bob have agreed on a linear error-correcting code with encoding and decoding functions
Enc : {0, 1}`+κ → {0, 1}n and Dec : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`+κ. The choice of κ and n depends on
the bit error rate of the quantum channel and on the required amount of privacy amplification.
Furthermore Alice and Bob have agreed on a MAC function Γ : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ, and
8 For the noiseless case, the optimum is the length of the plaintext minus one [2].
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two pairwise independent hash functions Fu : {0, 1}n × Bn × {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}n × Bn (u ∈ U) and
Gv : {0, 1}n × Bn × Q → {0, 1}` × Bn (v ∈ V).9 The λ is a security parameter for the MAC
function and is constant with respect to n.
Alice’s plaintext is µ ∈ {0, 1}`−2λ. The key material shared between Alice and Bob consists of a
mask z ∈ {0, 1}n, a MAC key ξ ∈ {0, 1}λ for Alice’s message, a basis sequence b ∈ Bn, a MAC key
k ∈ {0, 1}λ for Bob’s feedback bit, and seeds u ∈ U , v ∈ V for pairwise independent hashing.10
Furthermore Alice and Bob have a ‘reservoir’ of additional spare key material.
One round of the protocol consists of the following steps (see Fig. 2):
Encryption:
Alice generates random strings r ∈ {0, 1}κ, k′ ∈ {0, 1}λ. She computes the authentication tag
τ = Γ(ξ, µ‖k′), the ‘augmented message’ m = µ‖k′‖τ (with m ∈ {0, 1}`), the Encoding c =
Enc(m‖r) ∈ {0, 1}n, and the qubit payload x = c ⊕ z. She prepares |Ψ〉 = ⊗ni=1 |ψbixi〉 and sends|Ψ〉 to Bob.
Decryption:
Bob receives |Ψ′〉. He measures |Ψ′〉 in the basis b. The result is x′ ∈ {0, 1}n. He computes
c′ = x′⊕ z. He tries to recover mˆ‖rˆ = Dec(c′). If decoding does not generate a failure notification,
he discards rˆ and parses mˆ as mˆ = µˆ‖kˆ′‖τˆ . He also computes cˆ = Enc(mˆ‖rˆ) and xˆ = cˆ⊕ z.
Feedback:
Bob checks if Γ(ξ, µˆ‖kˆ′) == τˆ . He sets ω = 1 (‘Accept’) if the error correction did not fail and
the MAC τˆ is correct; ω = 0 (‘Reject’) otherwise. He computes τfb = Γ(k, ω) and sends ω, τfb to
Alice. Alice checks the MAC on the feedback.
Key Update:
The keys/seeds ξ, u, v are always re-used. The updated version of the z, b, k in the next round is
denoted as z˜, b˜, k˜.
• In case of Accept:
Alice sets k˜ = k′ and z˜||b˜ = Fu(x‖b‖r).
Bob sets k˜ = kˆ′ and z˜||b˜ = Fu(xˆ‖b‖rˆ).
• In case of Reject:
Alice and Bob take new z˜ and k˜ from their reservoir.
They take q ∈ Q from the reservoir and set b˜ = Gv(b‖q).
9 The set B is the alphabet of qubit basis choices. In BB84 encoding we have B = {+,×}; in 6-state encoding
B = {x, y, z}.
10 The strings u and v are never both used in the same round. We describe them independently since they have
a different length, but the shorter (v) may as well be a substring of the longer (u).
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Always re-use ⇠, u, v
Next round key in Accept case:
z˜kb˜ = Fu(xˆkbkrˆ), k˜ = kˆ0
In Reject case: z˜, k˜, q from reservoir
b˜ = Gv(bkq)
Figure 2: One round of our QKR protocol.
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5 Protocol reformulation for the security proof
We introduce a sequence of small modifications to the protocol of Section 4. While the original
protocol Eorig in Section 4 is the one that Alice and Bob actually execute, we will write down the
security proof for the modified protocol Emod. Due to their (almost-)equivalence, security of Emod
implies security of Eorig up to a constant 2−λ+1.
• We mask the qubit payload with public randomness.
• We go to an EPR version in order to apply standard proof methods.
• We add random permutation of the qubits so that post-selection can be used.
• We add random Pauli transforms in order to simplify the noisy state.
• We pretend that the two authentication tags cannot be forged.
5.1 Masking the qubit payload with public randomness
Alice picks a random string a ∈ {0, 1}n. She computes s = x ⊕ a. Instead of qubit states |ψbixi〉
she prepares |ψbisi〉. We denote Bob’s measurement result as t ∈ {0, 1}n. Alice publishes a over
an authenticated channel.11 Bob computes x′ = t⊕ a. Note that Eve learns a only after she has
attacked the qubits. Since a is public and independently random, this roundabout way of getting
x′ to Bob is equivalent to the original protocol as far as security is concerned.
5.2 EPR version of the protocol
Instead of having Alice prepare a qubit state and Bob measuring it, now Eve prepares a noisy
two-qubit EPR state (singlet state) and gives the two subsystems ‘A’ and ‘B’ to Alice and Bob
respectively. Alice and Bob measure their i’th qubit in basis bi; this yields si for Alice and ti for
Bob, where ti equals si plus noise. The si (or ti) is random.
Alice computes a = s⊕ x and publishes a in an authenticated way. Bob computes y = t⊕ a. The
rest of the classical processing is the same as in the original protocol, with x′ = y¯.
Note that the statistics of the variables s, t, a, x, x′ is the same as in Section 5.1, although the
origin of the variables is now different. The equivalence between prepare-and-measure on the one
hand and the EPR mechanism on the other hand has been exploited in many works.
5.3 Adding a random permutation
After Eve has handed out all n EPR pairs, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a random permuta-
tion pi. Before performing any measurement they both apply pi to their own set of n qubits. Then
they forget pi. The remainder of the protocol is as in Section 5.2.
For Alice and Bob the effect of the permutation is that the noise is distributed differently over the
qubits. The error-correction step is insensitive to the location of bit errors; only the number of
bit errors matters. Hence all the classical variables that are processed/computed after the error
correction step are unaffected by pi. The only output variable of the protocol that is affected is a.
However, a was a uniform12 random variable and has now become a different uniform variable; as
far as security is concerned, the new protocol is equivalent to the one in Section 5.2.
Let Eperm denote the protocol containing the random permutation step. In the language of Sec-
tion 2.3 we can write Eperm ◦ pi = Eperm. (After all, a permutation followed by a random permu-
tation is a random permutation.) We conclude that the post-selection criterion holds and we can
apply (2).
Note that Eperm needs quantum memory. This has no practical significance, since Alice and Bob
actually execute Eorig, while Eperm is a proof-technical fiction.
11 This is a tamper-proof channel with perfect authentication.
12 From Eve’s point of view, a gets randomized by x, which is uniform because it is built from z, which is unknown
to Eve.
8
5.4 Adding random Pauli transforms
This is the trick introduced by [15]. For each individual EPR pair, Alice and Bob publicly agree
on a random α ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. They both apply the Pauli transform σα to their own qubit state,
and then forget α. This happens before they do their measurement. The rest of the protocol is as
in section 5.3. The mapping in a single qubit position can be written as
ρAB 7→ ρ˜AB = 14
∑
α
(σα ⊗ σα)ρAB(σα ⊗ σα). (5)
The net effect of the Pauli transforms is that the measurement sequence b gets randomized13 with
public randomness; but b was already random, so security-wise nothing has changed.
The random-Paulis trick yields a major simplification: For six-state encoding (and higher), only
one degree of freedom is left in the description of Eve’s state, namely the bit error probability.
This was an important ingredient of the security proof in [5].
5.5 Pretending that the authentication tags are unforgeable
We pretend that Eve is unable to forge the authentication tags τ and τfb, which is true except with
probability ≤ 2 · 2−λ. This has two benefits: (i) We get rid of complicated case-by-case analyses
that would allow events where the error correction yields a wrong mˆ, rˆ without warning, while
τˆ looks correct; (ii) In the Accept case Bob’s reconstructed variables mˆ, rˆ automatically equal
Alice’s m, r, thus reducing the number of variables.
5.6 Effect of the modifications
Fig. 3 depicts the protocol Emod. Due to the unforgeability of the tags we can write
‖Eorig −Forig‖ ≤ 2−λ+1 + ‖Emod −Fmod‖. (6)
Furthermore, due to the permutation invariance of Emod we can apply the post-selection proof
technique and use (2). Finally, thanks to the random Paulis, the state σ in (2) will have the very
simple form that makes it possible to arrive at an expression like (4).
6 The output state
The Completely Positive Trace Preserving (CPTP) map Emod acts on the ‘AB’ subsystem (the 2n
qubits controlled by Alice and Bob) without affecting the ‘E’ subsystem. We write
Emod = T ◦ P ◦M ◦ I. (7)
The map I fetches the classical input variables,M is the measurement, P is the classical process-
ing, and T traces away all variables that are not outputs. The input variables are mzbkuv. We
have I(ρABE) = Emzbkuv|mzbkuv〉〈mzbkuv| ⊗ ρABE.14 Note that all input variables except m are
uniform.
The measurement M introduces coupling between the classical b register and the quantum state.
Furthermore, it destroys the AB subsystem and creates new classical registers s, t ∈ {0, 1}n.
M(|b〉〈b| ⊗ ρABE) = Est|bst〉〈bst| ⊗ ρEbst. (8)
For the factorised form of ρABE it holds that Est(· · · ) =
∑
st 2
−nPt|s(· · · ), with Pt|s def= γ|s⊕t¯|(1−
γ)|s⊕t|, where γ is the bit error probability caused by Eve.
13 Let Alice and Bob both perform a projective measurement on their own part of ρ˜AB in basis |ψbx〉, |ψbx〉. This
can be rewritten as projective measurements on ρAB in basis σα|ψbx〉, σα|ψbx〉.
14 One can also start from a protocol description E ′mod that acts on a state |inputs〉〈inputs| ⊗ ρAB, i.e. E ′mod
describes how the protocol acts on the quantum state ρAB given some value of the classical inputs. The quantity
of interest is then E ′mod acting on a linear combination of input values; this exactly matches the above mapping I.
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Always re-use ⇠, u, v
Next round key in Accept case:
z˜kb˜ = Fu(xˆkbkrˆ), k˜ = kˆ0
Reject: z˜, k˜, q from reservoir
b˜ = Gv(bkq)
Figure 3: The modified protocol with EPR states, random permutation, random Pauli transforma-
tions and perfect authentication. The notation pi stands for a permutation and Σ for a vector of
n Pauli matrices.
The processing P introduces the new variables:15 r is generated randomly, cxayωz˜b˜ are created
by Alice and Bob’s computations and q is fetched from the reservoir. Let nβ be the number of bit
errors that the error-correcting code can correct. We define the indicator function θst such that
θst = 1 when |s¯⊕ t| ≤ nβ and θst = 0 otherwise.
(P ◦M ◦ I)(ρABE) = Emzbkuvrq|mzbrkuvq〉〈mzbkuvrq| ⊗ Est|st〉〈st| ⊗ ρEbst∑
cxayωz˜b˜
|cxayωz˜b˜〉〈cxayωz˜b˜|δc,Enc(m‖r)δx,c⊕zδa,x⊕s
δy,t⊕aδω,θst
[
θstδz˜‖b˜,Fu(x‖b‖r) + θst2
−nδb˜,Gv(b‖q)
]
. (9)
The protocol output consists of the classical variables aωmz˜b˜uv. The map T traces out all the
15Here we do not keep track of the update k˜. Its security is trivial: it is updated either from m, which is
confidential, or from the reservoir.
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non-output registers. Applying this trace to (9) yields
Emod(ρABE) = ρUV Z˜B˜MAΩE
= Euvmz˜b˜a
∑
ω
|uvz˜b˜maω〉〈uvz˜b˜maω| ⊗ [ωρE[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
+ ωρ
E[ω=0]
vb˜a
] (10)
ρ
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
= Ebstρ
E
bstθst2
n|B|nErδz˜‖b˜,Fu[(s⊕a)‖b‖r] (11)
ρ
E[ω=0]
vb˜a
= Ebstρ
E
bstθst|B|nEqδb˜,Gv(b‖q). (12)
In slight abuse of notation we have written 2−n
∑
a = Ea, 2
−n∑
z˜ = Ez˜, |B|−n
∑
b˜ = Eb˜. In
(10,11,12) we should have formally written ρ
E[ω=1]
uvb˜z˜ma
and ρ
E[ω=0]
uvb˜z˜ma
, but in the subscript we have
kept only the variables on which the state actually has dependence.
The idealized version Fmod of the protocol is obtained by first executing Emod, then tracing away
the message m and the keys uvz˜b˜, and finally replacing them with completely random values.16
Fmod(ρABE) = χUV Z˜B˜A ⊗ Em
∑
ω
|mω〉〈mω| ⊗
(
ωρE[ω=1] + ωρE[ω=0]
)
(13)
ρE[ω=1] = Ebstρ
E
bstθst (14)
ρE[ω=0] = Ebstρ
E
bstθst. (15)
The states with label ‘[ω = 1]’ are sub-normalised; we have tr ρE[ω=1] = Pcorr and Eutr ρ
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
=
Pcorr, where we define Pcorr as the probability that the number of errors can be corrected. In the
factorised form of ρ it holds that
Pcorr(n, β, γ) = Estθst =
bnβc∑
c=0
(
n
c
)
γc(1− γ)n−c. (16)
Similarly tr ρE[ω=0] = 1− Pcorr and Evtr ρE[ω=0]vb˜z˜a = 1− Pcorr.
Note that when m is uniform, the trace distance of the actual versus the ideal output state has an
intuitive meaning as the distance of the keys/seeds from uniformity given Eve’s side information,∥∥∥(Emod −Fmod)(ρABE)∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥ρUV Z˜B˜MAΩE − χMUV Z˜B˜ρAΩE∥∥∥
1
(17)
= 2d(MUV Z˜B˜|AΩE). (18)
7 Security Proof
7.1 Attacker Model
The attacker model is the standard one in quantum cryptography. No information leaks from the
labs of Alice or Bob, i.e. there are no side-channels. Eve fully controls the environment outside Alice
and Bob’s labs. Eve has unbounded quantum memory and unbounded (quantum-)computational
resources. Eve’s measurements are noiseless.
7.2 Forward secrecy
Equations (10) and (13) serve as the starting point for the security proof. Note that the expression
(13) is also obtained if M is not traced away; consequently the analysis of known-plaintext and
unknown-plaintext attacks turns out to be identical, just as was the case in [5].
An even stronger result holds: In (10) the M is entirely decoupled from Eve’s (classical and
quantum) side information and from the next-round variables UV Z˜B˜. Hence our protocol has
forward secrecy: a compromise of the updated keys has no impact on the secrecy of the message µ
[16].
16 The distribution of m does not have to be uniform.
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7.3 Main result: upper bound on the diamond norm
Theorem 7.1 Let ρABE have the factorised form (σABE)⊗n, with σABE symmetrised by the ran-
dom Pauli transform. Let ε be a smoothing parameter, and let ρ¯ denote a smoothed state. Then∥∥∥Eorig −Forig∥∥∥ <
2−λ+1 + (n+ 1)15
[
1
2
√|Q| + min
(
Pcorr, ε+
1
2
trE
√
2n−κ|B|ntrBS(ρ¯BSE)2
)]
. (19)
The min{· · · } term is the same as in (3) with ` replaced by n−κ. This implies the asymptotic result
(4) with ` replaced by n − κ. Asymptotically it holds that the error correction redundancy has
size n− (`+κ)→ nh(γ). This then yields an expression 12
√
2`−n+nh({1−
3
2γ,
γ
2 ,
γ
2 ,
γ
2 }). We conclude
that the asymptotic rate (`/n) equals 1− h({1− 32γ, γ2 , γ2 , γ2 }), as mentioned in Section 2.4.
The term 1
2
√
|Q| dictates that, in order to have α bits of security, we have to set log |Q| >
30 log(n+ 1)− 2 + 2α. Hence in case of Reject the amount of expended key material is n− 1 +
30 log(n+ 1) + λ+ 2α. Asymptotically this is n[1 +O( lognn )].
Proof of Theorem 7.1: The term 2−λ+1 comes from the transition from Eorig to Emod. The factor
(n + 1)15 comes from applying the postselection theorem (2). For bounding the trace norm
‖(Emod − Fmod)(ρABE)‖1, we start from (10),(13) and use the fact that the eigenvalue problem
reduces to an individual eigenvalue problem for each value of the classical variables, orthogonal to
the other values. We get
‖(Emod −Fmod)(ρABE)‖1 = Dacc +Drej (20)
Dacc = Eumz˜b˜a
∥∥∥ρE[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
− ρE[ω=1]
∥∥∥
1
(21)
Drej = Evmz˜b˜a
∥∥∥ρE[ω=0]
vb˜z˜a
− ρE[ω=0]
∥∥∥
1
. (22)
First we provide two upper bounds on Dacc. The first one simply follows from the triangle
inequality,
Eu
∥∥∥ρE[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
− ρE[ω=1]
∥∥∥
1
≤ Eu‖ρE[ω=1]ub˜z˜a ‖1 + Eu‖ρ
E[ω=1]‖1 (23)
= Eutr ρ
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
+ tr ρE[ω=1] = 2Pcorr. (24)
The second bound on Dacc takes some more work. We introduce smoothing of ρ as in [15, 11, 17],
allowing states ρ¯ that are ε-close to ρ in the sense of trace distance. We have Dacc ≤ 2ε + Dacc,
with Dacc = Euvmz˜b˜a‖ρ¯E[ω=1]ub˜z˜a − ρ¯E[ω=1]‖1. We write
Dacc = Emuz˜b˜atr
√
(ρ¯
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
− ρ¯E[ω=1])2 (25)
Jensen≤ Emz˜b˜atr
√
Eu(ρ¯
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
− ρ¯E[ω=1])2 (26)
= Emz˜b˜atr
√
Eu(ρ¯
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
)2 − (ρ¯E[ω=1])2. (27)
In (26) we used Jensen’s inequality for concave operators. In (27) we used Euρ¯
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
= ρ¯E[ω=1].
Next we evaluate the expression under the square root, making use of the properties of the pairwise
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independent hash function F . Squaring (11) yields
Eu(ρ¯
E[ω=1]
ub˜z˜a
)2 − (ρ¯E[ω=1])2
= Ebb′ss′tt′ ρ¯
E
bstρ¯
E
b′s′t′θstθs′t′2
2n|B|2nEurr′δz˜‖b˜,Fu[(s⊕a)‖b‖r]δz˜‖b˜,Fu[(s′⊕a)‖b′‖r′] − (ρ¯E[ω=1])2 (28)
= Ebb′ss′tt′ ρ¯
E
bstρ¯
E
b′s′t′θstθs′t′Err′[1+(2
n|B|n−1)δss′δbb′δrr′ ]−(ρ¯E[ω=1])2 (29)
= (2n|B|n − 1)2−κEbb′ss′tt′δbb′δss′ ρ¯Ebstρ¯Eb′s′t′θstθs′t′ (30)
< 2n−κ|B|nEbb′ss′tt′δbb′δss′ ρ¯Ebstρ¯Eb′s′t′ (31)
= 2n−κ|B|nEbb′ss′δbb′δss′ ρ¯Ebsρ¯Eb′s′ = 2n−κ|B|ntrBS(ρ¯BSE)2. (32)
In (31) we used θst ≤ 1. We have obtained the bound Dacc <
√
2n−κ|B|n· trE
√
trBS(ρ¯BSE)2. We
derive a bound on Drej using similar steps, but without the smoothing. Squaring (12) and taking
the expectation Ev we get
Ev(ρ
E[ω=0]
vb˜z˜a
)2 − (ρE[ω=0])2
= Ebb′ss′tt′ρ
E
bstρ
E
b′s′t′θst θs′t′Eqq′ |B|2nEv
[
δb˜,Gv(b‖q)δb˜,Gv(b′‖q′)
]
− (ρE[ω=0])2 (33)
= Ebb′ss′tt′ρ
E
bstρ
E
b′s′t′θst θs′t′Eqq′
{
1 + (|B|n − 1)δbb′δqq′
}
− (ρE[ω=0])2 (34)
=
|B|n − 1
|Q| Ebb′ss′tt′δbb′ρ
E
bstρ
E
b′s′t′θst θs′t′ (35)
<
|B|n
|Q| Ebb′ss′tt′δbb′ρ
E
bstρ
E
b′s′t′ =
|B|n
|Q| Ebb′δbb′ρ
E
b ρ
E
b′ =
1
|Q| (ρ
E)2. (36)
In the last step we used the special property that ρEb does not actually depend on b and thus
equals ρE [5]. (This property holds for the factorised and Pauli-symmetrised form of ρABE.) We
have obtained a bound Drej < 1/
√|Q|. 
In the proof above the updated k˜ does not appear explicitly. The security of k˜ is guaranteed
because (i) in the Accept case the update resides inside m, which is secure; (ii) in the Reject case
the update is done from the reservoir.
Similarly, in the proof the MAC key ξ does not appear explicitly. The fact that m is secure implies
that the tag τ remains confidential (τ is a part of m), and hence there is no leakage about the
MAC key ξ that was used to create the tag.
8 Discussion
We have shown that the protocol in [5] can be modified in a way that eliminates all classical
communication from Alice to Bob, without increasing the number of qubits. Essentially we have
moved the classical OTP of [5] to the next QKR round. Furthermore the error correction and
authentication are happening ‘inside’ the quantum state. The asymptotic communication rate
is not affected and is equal to the rate of QKD with one-way postprocessing. Our protocol has
forward secrecy.
The size of the keys shared by Alice and Bob is n+ n log |B|+ log |U|+ 2λ, (namely z ∈ {0, 1}n,
b ∈ Bn, u ∈ U , ξ ∈ {0, 1}λ, k ∈ {0, 1}λ), with log |U| = n + n log |B|. The size of U could be
reduced to log |U| ≈ κ by using almost-pairwise independent hashes.
Another way of reducing the size of the initial key material is reducing the size of z by κ. In the
encoding step we can choose to write c in systematic form. Then a part of c literally equals r,
which is already uniform. Since there is no need to mask an already uniform string, the size of
z and therefore the initial key material is reduced. Furthermore, the length of the seeds u, v is
reduced by κ. The rate is unaffected by this modification.
It is possible to take the seed u from public randomness that is drawn in every QKR round. This
would not affect the security, and it would reduce the amount of shared key material. However, it
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would require either (a) a source of public randomness that is not known by Eve beforehand, e.g.
a broadcast; or (b) communication of u from Alice to Bob or the other way round. The former
involves nontrivial logistics, while the latter violates the aims of this paper.
In the Accept case the reservoir of shared key material remains untouched. In the Reject case the
number of bits expended from the reservoir is n+O(log n). Asymptotically, in the noiseless case
(n → ` + κ, κ → 0), this expenditure is very close to the optimum value ` [2]. (It is not possible
to protect an `-bit message information-theoretically with less than ` bits of key expenditure.)
We have not done anything about the classical feedback from Bob to Alice. It cannot be removed,
because Alice needs to know if Bob correctly received her message. On the other hand, one
can consider a scenario where Alice and Bob are both senders, in an alternating way. Then the
feedback bit can be placed inside the next message, resulting in a fully quantum conversation.
There is one drawback to the protocol described in this paper. It is bad at dealing with erasures.
As the actual message (as opposed to a random string) is encoded in the quantum state, absorption
of qubits in the quantum channel has to be compensated in the error-correcting code. The effect
of erasures on the rate is severe. A solution as proposed in [5] would imply that the message is no
longer encoded directly in the qubits; instead Alice sends a random string to Bob, part of which
survives the channel and gets used to derive an OTP. Such a solution does not satisfy the aims of
this paper.
As a topic for future work we mention finite-size analysis, e.g. smoothing without taking the limit
n→∞.
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